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ANIMALS IN THE POETICS
Q(slC(| ·*-4_
According

to

ôS£P

by David Gallop

Aristotle,

art

(technë)

imitates

/H W {7 f
nature. This

celebrated doctrine is not limited to what we cal 1 the /fine artsf,
or to works of fartf in any narrow modern sense; and it does not
mean that such art-works copy things

in the natural

order. It

means, more generally, that craftsmen adopt means to produce ends;
and that

in doing

so,

they follow

a pattern

found

throughout

organic nature. The crafts, in their respective domains, do what
nature does everywhere. This parallel often provides Aristotle with
analogies from the crafts to illuminate the workings of nature.
,The Poetics is uniquely interesting in that it shows his mind
moving,

as it were,

in the opposite direction.

particular craft, that of the poet,
from organic nature.

To illuminate a

he sometimes uses analogies

In this paper I explore these analogies for

the light they throw upon his conception of the poetTs work, and
especially upon his defence of epic and drama against the assaults
of Plato.

2

Aristotle’s use of zoological models is not, of course, new.
Organic

thinking

pervades

Greek

philosophy from its earliest
3
stages, and is especially common in Plato. But in Aristotle it
assumes a distinctive form. He repeatedly draws ideas from his own
arsenal of biological concepts and applies them in characteristic
fashion to a variety of phi 1osophica1 issues.

Today,

when

the

biological framework of his thinking has been widely appreciated
in other areas,

I hope that its bearing upon his literary theory

will repay a fresh look.

2

By

'zoological'

models

I shall

mean comparisons of poetic

works not only with animals but also with likenesses of animals.
zôion can mean

’picture’ as well as ’animal ’; and zôgraphia for

painting embodies a connection between that art and its living
subjects that is absent from our words ’painting’. ’picture’, or
’portrait'. 4 Just as a picture commonly depicted a live subject, so
Aristotle could naturally think of the subject-matter represented
by poetry as analogous to a living thing. He could also think of
the different types of poetic product as akin to living species,
and as needing to be methodically classified, if they were to be
scientifically understood.
This is apparent in the very first sentence of the Poetics
(47a8-13), where Aristotle approaches poetry, as Northrop Frye has
said,
as a biologist would approach a system of organisms, picking
out -its genera and species, formulating the broad laws of
literary experience, and in short writing as though he
believed that there is a totally intelligible structure of
knowledge attainable about poetry which is not poetry itself
or the experience of it, but poetics.
But here the title Poetics

(literally. ’On poetic [craft]’), like

our own word ’poetry’, is liable to mislead us. These words derive
from poiesis which meant,

quite generally, ’making’. Plato had

noticed [Symposium 205d~e) the peculiar narrowing of usage that
restricted this word to the making of metrical verses. Carpenters
and blacksmiths are not ’poets ’ in this sense ; even t hough they are
as ’poetic' in the original broad sense as any wordsmiJth. But in
Aristotle’s

hands

the

word

conjunction with mimesis,
although

still

limited

poiesis,

undergoes
to

verbal

especially

as

a further shift,
’making’,

it

used

in

in which,
is

sharply

dissociated from the use of metre.
This shift is of fundamental importance.

If metre is made a

defining property of 'poetry', then Plato's Phaedrus or the Book
of Revelation, for all the beauty of their language, would no more
count

as

'poetry'

than

the

novels

of

Agatha

Christie

or

the

Canadian Constitution; whereas most of Hamlet and all of Paradise
Lost would qualify as 'poetry', but so equally would the crudest
In combating this view of poiêsis,

limerick on a washroom wall:

Aristotle makes a momentous point. He says that Empedocles, though
he

used

the same metre as Homer,

should

be called a 'natural

philosopher' (phusiologos) rather than a 'poet'(47b17-20). And the
works

of Herodotus

would not cease

to be

'history of a sort'

(historia tis) even if they were put into metrical verse (51b2-4).
Empedocles wrote an account of the physical world, and therefore
was primarily what we should call a natural scientist. Herodotus,
who recorded the struggle between the Creeks and Persians, was what
we should call an historian. On the other hand, Aristotle notices
(47b9-13), there is no single word for what Plato's dialogues have
in

common

with the

mimes

of

Sophron

and

Xenarchus,

realistic

sketches dramatizing the events of everyday life.
Aristotle is

here

remarking

the

lack of

a word

covering

representational making (47b15), whether in verse or in prose. What
made Homer or Plato 'poetic'- in this sense was not the fact that
they were making something

in metre,

but that they were ma ki nq

something up. Plato was not constrained by facts about real-life
conversât ions of the historic Socrates. Homer was not constrained
by

facts about the Trojan

Wars as Herodotus was constrained by
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facts about the.Persian Wars. When Homer and Plato produced their
works, they invented conversations and incidents. They used their
imaginations. In a word, they composed fiction.
That is what the Poetics is primarily about.

It deals with

those verbal products in which we invent, feign, or make up things
that claim no fidelity to fact- These products can be made well or
badly,

but they are so not by virtue of being true or false to

historical or scientific fact,

but by virtue of quite different

criteria, which Aristotle makes it his main business to explore.
Thus, what he says, though mostly stemming from two verse genres,
epic and tragedy, has a far wider relevance.

Much of it applies

to plays, stories, novels, and fiction in general. And the central
idea

in

his

defence

of

poiêsis

was

that

Plato

had

radically

misrepresented the nature and purpose of fiction. In broad outline
that response will be familiar enough, but I shall try to bring
some of its detail into sharper focus.
Plato's
briefly

charges

recalled

against

the

from their

representational

famous

formulation

poet

may

be

in Republic X.

First, the tragedian and all other representers are 'third from the
king and the truth’ (59?e8-8): the poet has only a tenuous grasp
of reality or truth. Second, the poet appeals to an inferior side
of our nature, to emotions that should not be indulged but held
firmly

under

control.

representational
ability

poetry

to manage

(Republic 604c~d).

our

The
is

emotional

injurious,

emotions

in

the

release afforded
because

it

stresses

weakens
of

real

by
our
life

5
Two points in this attack receive special emphasis, both made
through analogies between poetry and painting. First, the poet is
reproached for using alluring language: just as painters rely.on
colour and shape, so poets rely upon metre and melody. The appeal
of

both

is spurious,

the former

beguiling

us with shapes

and

colours, the latter with words and music, into thinking that they
know what they are talking about (601a-b).
Secondly,

the

painter

represents

things

in

the

world

of

sensible particulars, ordinary beds and tables, and the carpenters
that make them (598a~c). Likewise, the poet represents particular
battles and the generals that fight them. Such objects or events
are the stuff of ordinary human experience, not the metaphysical
realities or universal truths that can be grasped, in abstraction
from their particular instances, only by a philosopher. So poets
have no genuine knowledge, but only the most superficial grasp of
the realities they purport to depict.
Aristotle responds to both those points. The first, he thinks,
mistakes

what

is peripheral

Metrical or lyrical

for

what

is essential

to poetry.

language merely ’garnishes' the poet’s work

·. (49b28), but forms no essential part of it. To locate the pleasure
of tragedy in its use of language is to miss what Aristotle calls
its ’proper’ pieasure, i.e . that which derives from its distinctive
function. Lyric poetry , though said, to be -the most important of
garnishings' (50b16), is peripheral. The same goes for spectacle
(opsis), which Aristotle says is 'emotionally powerful but is the
least integral of all to the poet’s art' (50b16-18).
/
.

6

This last point is made several times,
tragic

drama

can

achieve

its

impact

even

by emphasizing that
without

theatrical

performance or actors (53b1~7, cf. 50b18~20, 62a11-13, a17-18): it
merely needs to be heard. Aristotle thinks of plays being read, as
epics were recited, aloud. This confirms the view of poiésis taken
above. For if it is essentially what we call 'fiction', then indeed
its

central

appeal

does

not

depend

upon

metrical

or

lyrical

language, nor does it require theatrical performance. And for us,
even

if not for the ancients,

the

pleasure of

fiction can

be

obtained from reading prose narrative or drama alone in silence.
The answer to Plato’s second point is contained in Aristotle’s
famous contrast between

’poetry’ and history. This turns upon a

distinction between
events which have occurred (ta genomena, 51a35~38, b4)
and
the kind of events which could occur, and are possible by the
standards of probability or necessity. (51a38-38, b5).
The former are the domain of the historian, the latter of the
poet. Aristotle continues:

..

It is for this reason that poetry is both more philosophical
and more serious than, history, since poetry speaks more of
universals, history of particulars. A ’universal’ comprises
the kind of speech or action which belongs by probability or
necessity to a certain kind of character. (51b5~9)
The distinctions drawn here are not, Aristotle proceed^ to argue
(51b29~32),

invalidated

actual events and real

by the fact

that

dramatists

often

use

individuals for their subjects. Historic

facts may serve the poetic purpose as well as purely imaginary
ones. The depiction of ’the kind of events which could occur’ can
be achieved as well by the appropriate treatment of real events as

I
by inventing fictitious ones. Thus Plato’s, charge that the poet
represents mere particulars misses its target, even in those cases
where the events dramatized actually took place.
This passage, and a later one (59a17-29), which draws some
further contrasts between the poet and the historian, have often
been criticized for their primitive view of history.
criticism is well-founded,

and there

is no point

8

Much of the

in trying to

defend Aristotle against all that may be urged against him. But he
can

still

be said

to have

put

his

finger on the fundamental
9
difference between history and fiction. The historian's task is to
discover and narrate the course of particular events. This task
functions as an overriding constraint.

It dictates, for example,

that the temporal order of events not be altered; that significant
events not be omitted from the narrative; that events which are not
known to have happened, or are known not to have happened, not be
invented; and that statements based upon firm evidence should be
distinguished from speculation or gossip.
No such constraints limit the writer of fiction.

Even in a

play based on real events,

fidelity to fact is not of primary

importance,

prefer

though we

may

the

historical

record

to

be

respected where it is known for certain. Where the facts are not
known, story-tellers are free to invent, supplement, order events,
introduce imaginary characters or. episodes, to suit their purposes.
And in pure fiction, they are free to do whatever they please. They
can use events and characters in their stories to exhibit whatever
general truths about human behaviour they wish to il lústrate. The
exhibition of such truths is, moreover/ the dynamo that powers

8

their narrative. Here, they say, is a certain sort of person placed
in a certain sort of situation, and this will show you the kind of
thing that is done or experienced by such people when they are
placed in such situations (51b8-10).
This is the sense in which poiêsis is 'more philosophical'
history.

Historians are not committed ex officio to exhibiting

general truths about human life. Their central task as historians
is simply to record events as they have grounds for believing them
to have occcurred. They are not entitled to trim, adjust, distort
or supplement them, in order to support a generalization or point
a moral, or to make the story more interesting.^
Historians are limited, then, by the facts about Alcibiades,
whatever

those

facts

were.

Their

primary

purpose

is,

to that

extent, particular, not general. Since they are in no position to
generalize until they have established the facts, universels cannot
be their starting point. Story-telTers, by contrast, start from
general truths to which they are independently committed, and aim
to exhibit those truths to their audience or readers. That is why
Aristotle says (51b9-10): 'this is what poiêsis aims at, assigning
names'. He means that it has a generalizing aim, despite assigning
names to the characters, or perhaps that it assigns names at a
later stage of composition.^ The fiction-writer has in mind, at
least initially, not individuals but character-types,

which the

characters are chosen to exemplify . So indeed fiction-writers have
often conceived of their task. It is what Aristotle saw as their
task, and what he thought that Plato had disastrously ignored, when
he damned the poet as 'third from the king and the truth'.

9
So much for some highlights of Aristotle's response to Plato.
It will now be profitable to review some 'zoological' texts.
12
In his analysis of the 'qualitative parts’ of tragedy (ch 6),
Aristotle places enormous stress upon the factor of piot—structure
(muthos), which he calls 'the first principle (arche) and. so to
speak, the soul (psuchi) of tragedy’ (50a38-39). We should read the
organic metaphor here in the light of Aristotle's mature philosophy
of mind. The psuchi is the 'form* of the living body. It is the
distinctive set of capacities in virtue of which an organism is a
creature of whatever kind it is.

Moreover, it is the attainment

of those capacities in the adult member of any species that is the
ultimate explanation for its physical structure, for the organs it
develops, and for every stage in its growth. Hence, its 'soul' is
the ultimate source of every feature that it possesses, which is
why Aristotle here conjoins psuchi with arche.
This conception of the soul finds a clear analogue in tragic
plot.

The plot is what determines everything that happens in a

play,

including everything

shapes

the

entire

action

that the characters
from

start

to

say and do.

finish,

just

as

It
the

capacities that a living animal must have, if it is to be whatever
kind of creature it is, determine its physical make-up and direct
each stage of its growth from conception to maturity.
The plot, then, determines the unfolding of thé action, much
as

the soul

determines

the

course

of

an

animal’s growth.

It

functions, in Aristotelian terms, as a *final cause', a goal in the
dramatist’s design. Thus ’the events and the piot-structure' are
called ’the goal’ (telos) of tragedy; and the goal is said to be

10

'what matters most of all' (50a22-23,

cf. 50b22~23). telos here

does not mean the terminus of the play's action, but is applied to
the whole nexus of events in which the tragedy consists.
That

nexus must,

however,

have an ending,

a single final

outcome, which the events dramatized conspire to bring about. And
this outcome will necessarily affect the dramatist's structuring
of the events that produce it. For they will be placed where they
are,

so

that

they

may

bring

about

whatever

ending

the

plot

dictates, e.g. the downfall of Oedipus through the discovery of his
own guilt. The play must unfold so as to lead intelligibly to that
final outcome. The earlier events must be presented so that they
appear to necessitate, or at least render probable, the later ones.
But in terms of plot construction, the shoe is on the other foot:
it is the final outcome that may be said to necessitate the events
that bring it about.
Thus, governing the composition of a play there is something
analogous

to what

Aristotle

elsewhere

(Phys. 11.9,

PA 639b24-

64 0a11, 642a1-642b4) cal Is 'hypothetical necessity', which controls
or directs-the development of an animal. If that is how things are:
finally going to turn out, then this is what has to happen earlier
to secure that result. A must happen, so that B may follow. C must
say D so that E will believe F about G, and will therefore commit
H,.. which will lead I to tell J that K has .said L. This will ensure
that M does N to 0, in order that P may do Q to R. And thus S will
ask T to say U to V, so that W may persuade X to get Y to kill Z!
In securing the final outcome there is a place in drama, as
■ 1 ■' ■
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in organic growth, for the opérâtion of 1ikelihood or necessity.

.·

11
for

connect-tons

that

show

the sorts

experience would lead us to expect.

of

causal

relations

that

The impression must be given

that later events are the necessary or likely outcome of earlier
ones, since a plot will be plausible (pithanon, 51bl6,■ 55a30 , cf.
60a27-b1)

only

if

it

reflects

an order

of experience

that

is

intelligible to us. But like animal development, dramatic structure
is controlled essentially ’from the end’, and therefore it is the
ending to which we must ultimately look, if we wish to understand
the construction of a play.
In this way we may understand Aristotle’s stress upon the
importance of familiar sorts of necessary or probable connection
between

the

events

of

the

play,

even

where

the

plot takes

a

surprising turn (52a1-11, cf. 52a18-21). What is contrary to our
normal expectations, what does not form part of a coherent sequence
of events,

such as unlikely coincidence or the use of deus ex

machina (54b1~2) , wi 11 seem art if iciall y contri v'ed

demanded by the

requirements of the plot, rather than a credible representation of
human life and deliberately chosen action. To that extent the play
will fail of its purpose, to enlighten its audience by exhibiting
universal truths about human character and conduct.
In ch 7 Aristotle begins to lay down the principles of plot
construction.

He starts

by

resuming from 49b24-25

formal definition of tragedy as
which

is

complete

his

earlier

’a representation of an action

(teleles), who!e (holes)

and

of

a certain

magnitude* (50b23-25).
Teleios means ’mature*, ’fully developed*. The word suggests
T:v. V Λ ■ .V,'.':·
;·
Τ· ;-T:; T;·.:
./Τ'
■;
. / T,:.,V' ;
y' ; -.r T T i y . f - T · ■■ :·:■ ; T ;
/
that the action represented by the play must possess the wholeness

■■ .

■·.·■ : .'h .T

:
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of a full-grown animal.
teleios

in

this

'Whole', which may be meant to explicate

way,

is

itself

explicated

as

'possessing

a

beginning, middle and end', notions that are immediately defined
in

terms

of

necessary

temporally ordered

or

series

likely

causal

of events

relations

(50b27-31).

embody these relations so that the events

The

within
plot

a

must

of the play will

be

connected in the way we have Just considered.
What exactly does Aristotle mean here by 'beginning, middle
and end'? Does he think of the piot—structure in terms of animal
morphology,

comparing

it with

the

beginning,

middle

parts

and

extremities of an animal’s body? Or does he think of it by analogy
with the beginning, middle and ending of an animal's life, i.e. its
generation, middle life, and death? On the former interpretation,
the thought lies close to that of Plato's Phaedrus (264c), where
Socrates says that a speech
ought to be put together like a living creature, with a body
of its own, not headless or footless, but having middle parts
and extremities properly in keeping with each other, and with
the whole.
This

morphological

comparison

might

not,

at

first

sight,

seem

entirely apt for Aristotle's purpose. For an animal's 'beginning,
middle and- end’ are not, if we take them in this way, related in
a manner,wholly analogous to the phases, of a play's action. The
parts of an animal are not temporally ordered and so do not exhibit
the causal
action.

connection that

links successive

They do not constitute

Aristotle expressly defines
series. And teleute, used

'beginning,

them here,

phases of dramatic
middle and..end', as

in terms of a temporal

(50b26-27, b'29) for the 'ending' of the

action represented by the play, might seem more closely analogous
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to an animal's death than to an extremity of its body.
More to the point, therefore, might seem a comparison between
the phases of the action and the stages of an animal's life, its
generation,

middle

life,

and

death.

Analogously,

the

action

represented by a play must have a birth in time. True, it does not
start ex ni hi 1o and its antecedents must be revealed in the play
if we are to understand it at all.

But the beginning must be a

fresh point of departure. Similarly, it has a continuous history,
from conception onwards,

like an animal, each phase being linked

with what precedes and follows it, until the ending or 'death' with
which it finishes. Any later consequences of the action, though
they may be prefigured in the play, lie outside the action itself,
like the descendants of an animal.

If we are to understand the

zoological model in this 'temporal' sense, then the action of a
tragedy will be 'complete' or 'whole', not as an animal is 'fully
developed’ at maturity, but as it is 'finished' at death.
This interpretation of the model, however, must be wrong. For
in a counterpart passage about epic in ch 23 (59a17-21), we find
the same-comparison used morphologically:
As for the narrative art of mimesis in spoken verse, it is
evident that its plot-structures should have a dramatic
coherence, just as in tragedy, and that they should concern
an action which is unitary and complete (with beginning,
middle (mesa) and end (telos)), so that, as with a living
creature, the single and entire structure may yield the
pleasure which belongs to it.
Here Aristotle uses the plural mesa for 'middle*, clearly meaning
(like Socrates in the Phaedrus ) the middle parts of an animal's
- 13
body; and tel os for 'end', i.e .'extremity’, replaces teleute.
Moreover, the point is made that the epic must, like an animal ,

14
produce its 'proper pleasure’ through being ’one, whole’ (59a20).
But this must refer to the unity and wholeness of an animal viewed
at a given time, rather than the unity and wholeness possessed by
an animal’s entire life-span.
comparison

between

the

For Aristotle evidently intends a

pleasure

proper

to

observation

of

a

’complete' animal and the pleasure proper to the appreciation of
epic. Yet no distinctive pleasure is to be gained from surveying
an

animal’s entire

life-span.:

whereas

there

i_s a

distinctive

pleasure to be derived from synchronic observation of a unitary,
whole animal. The source of this pleasure throws much light upon
the

pleasure

proper

to epic

and

tragedy,

as we shall

shortly

see.
At 50b34-51a6 Aristotle considers the magnitude (megethos) of
the action to be represented:
Moreover, any beautiful object, whether a living creature or
any other structure of parts, must possess not only ordered
arrangement but also an appropriate scale (megethos) (for
beauty is grounded in both size and order). A creature could
not be beautful if it is either too small - for perception of
it is practically instantaneous and so cannot be experienced
JjT- - or too great, for contemplation of it cannot be a single
experience, and it is not possible to derive a sense of unity
and wholeness from our perception of it (imagine an animal a
thousand: mil es 1ong). Just, therefore, as a beautiful body or
creature must have some size, but one which allows it to be
perceived all together (eusunopton), so piot structures should
be of a length which can be easily held in the memory
(eumnêmoneuton).
Here we need to understand the point of comparing our experience
of the action represented by a tragedy with the viewing of a tiny
14
or an enormous animal.
We should first notice four occurrences
in 50b38-51a2 of the rich words theôrla and theôreln. They suggest
not just the plain ’seeing’ of an animal^ or merely 'looking at

it',

but

the

study

scientific

of

15
1t
it..

The

study

of

an

infinitesimally small animal is said to be ’confused* (sugcheitai),
because the creature is too tiny for its internal complexity to be
discerned. Without a microscope, which Aristotle of course lacked,
one could
and

not scrutinize it to see how its parts were structured,

how they functioned

for

the good

of the

whole.

It would

therefore lack any recognizable beauty. We could admire neither the
individual animal nor its species.
Conversely,

an animal

one thousand miles

1ong , though vits

parts could be inspected piece-meal over a long time, could not be
observed as a whole simultaneously from any single viewpoint. An
overview or conspectus of it would be impossible; and by the time
one had examined every part, all sense of its unity and wholeness
would be

16
lost.
Consequently, one could not understand how its

parts were interrelated, or how they worked to enable it to survive
and to flourish, in the manner proper to its species.
For Aristotle,
relation

to the

interrelated

however,

whole,

parts,

is

synoptic

and

of the

essential

if

viewing
whole
we

as

wish

of

the

parts

consisting
to

understand

in
of
a

creature and admire its species. That is why a fine animal has to
be of a certain magnitude.

Likewise with our appreciation of a

play. It requires close study of each of its 'parts’, analogous to
the study of an animal's anatomy. In the former case, when we see
the end to which something is a means, we admire the cunning of the
artist. In the latter case we admire the cunning of nature. But in
both cases, what is fundamental to our appreciation is a grasp of
the contribution made by each element to a properly integrated.

16
functioning whole.

This implication of the analogy can be best

understood from Aristotle’s zoological

writings,

especially the

Parts of Animals, where functional interdependence is illustrated
in detail

for a vast number of bodily organs,

themselves often

possessing huge internal complexity.
Just

as,

in the

composition

of

an

animal,

’nature makes

nothing in vain', so each element in a wel 1-constructed plot should
be placed where it is for good and sufficient reason.

For, as

Aristotle will say in ch 8, when discussing the unity that should
characterize the action represented by a tragedy,
... the plot structure, as the mimesis of action, should be
a représentâtion of a unitary and complete action; and its
parts, consisting of the events, should be so constructed that
the displacement or removal of any one of them will disturb
and disjoint the work's wholeness. For anything whose presence
or absence has no cléar effect cannot be counted an integral
part of the whole (51a31-35).
Any

item that

is genuinely

part

of

an

organic

whole

must

be

essential to it, or it will be a mere accretion. Similarly, every
incident in a plot should ’have a clear effect'

(poiei epidelon,

51a35), a discernible bearing upon what happens elsewhere in the
action, and thus, ultimately, upon the entire play. Whatever is
integral to the play’s action must contribute to the whole nexus
of events in which its plot consists. Our. grasp of the whole and
our

understanding

of

the

parts

are

thus, interrelated, each

complementing the other. We must therefore not only study each part
in detail but also gain a conspectus of the whole play.
Just as a perceptible structure is needed for a fine.animal,
to determine an appropriate size for it, so likewise for the action
represented by a tragic plot.· Just as the animal must have a size
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enabling it to be viewed all together as a whole, so the plot must
have such a length as can be readily remembered (51a4~6). By this
Aristotle means, I suggest, not that we must be able to remember
earlier stages of the plot while the later ones are still unfolding
before us in the theatre; but that after we have seen or read the
play, we must be able to recall the action as a whole, so that we
may discern and ponder the structural connections through which the
plot works. We must retain in the memory a conspectus of the plot
17
as representing a certain nexus of events.
For only if we
recognize its structure as representing that nexus, can we admire
the

whole

play

for

its

illumination

of

the

interplay

between

character and thought, motivation and action in real life. That is
why a synoptic overview of the plot is crucial for our learning
from the play, and hence for its proper magnitude.
If that interprêtâtion is correct, it has an important bearing
upon what Aristotle means by the pleasure that

is

'proper ’ to

tragedy (53b11). That pleasure .is, obtained not solely,

or even

primarily, while we are watching the play, but rather in subsequent
reflection upon it. For if tragedy's proper pleasure depends upon
seeing the parts in relation to the whole, it will not be available
to any viewer who has not yet gained a conspectus of the whole.
That conspectus

is not possible for an audience who are still

watching or hearing the play for the first time, especially for the
majority who have no prior knowledge of the plot.

The pleasure of

pondering the import of a story in its entirety will not felt by
first-time viewers or hearers till they have finished it.13 And even
those who know the story, though they, may recognize the ending as

18
foreshadowed in earlier episodes, will hardly be able to achieve
a conspectus of the play while they are engrossed in the detail of
any particular incident.

20

The pleasure must come, to an significant

extent, only after watching or reading.
That is why Aristotle, when giving practical guidance as to
a desirable length for the action of a play, can prescind (51a6-7)
from the dictates of competitive performance at drama festivals
(tous

agônas)

aisthêsin),

and

the

limits

of

an

audience's

attention

(ten

discounting these as irrelevant to the dramatist’s

craft as such. The dramatist need not be specially exercised about
the length or conditions of performance.' What matters is that the
21
action represented can be easily remembered.
It should be as large
c

as is consistent with its being ’visible all together’ (sundelos,
51a10-11). The same notion of conspectus reappears later (59b1920, cf. eusunoptos at 59a33) in the discussion of epic, where it
is required that the beginning and the end be perceivable at one
view

(sunorasthai).

22

The

entire

plot

of

the

Odyssey

can

be

summarized in a single 43-word sentence (55b17-23). But one cannot
achieve such an overview unless and until one has finished reading
or hearing the poem.
We must now notice a crucial feature of the- pleasure gained
from

retrospect

upon

an

entire

play.

This

pleasure

is

distinguishable from the responses of pity or fear felt while we
··"
23
are in the theatre or whi 1e the play is being read.
It is a
pleasure of the intellect, not a frisson, a harrowing, stirring or
venting of the emotions, even though those experiences may contain
their

own

kinds of

pleasure.

It

is a

çéflective,

scientific.

19
philosophical, dispassionate

24

pleasure, since it attends upon our

learning or understanding the 'universels' about human action and
suffering that the work has portrayed.
That this ijs the sort of pleasure that Aristotle has in mind
as ’proper’ to ’poetry’ is evidenced,

I believe,

passage in ch 4, to which we should now look back.

by a notorious
25

At 48b4-19 ’poetic' représentâtion is traced to two natural
and distinctively human instincts: (a) to represent (b5~8); and (b)
to enjoy représentât ions made by others (b8~9). In connection with
(b), Aristotle distinguishes between (i) pleasure due to learning
from certain likenesses qua representations of a familiar original
(b15-17),

and

(ii)

pleasure due to other aspects,

such as the

workmanship or colour (b17~19). The former sort of pleasure is said
to come about, because
it happens that, in viewing, they come to understand and infe^
what each thing [is], e.g. that this [person is] that one’.
Thus, the enjoyment of looking at the likenesses is bound up with
’understanding’ and ’inferring*; and these take place 'in viewing’.
But how do the viewers ’understand’ or ’infer what each thing is’?
What exactly is understood or inferred from what about what? How
does

’viewing’ enable

them

to

understand?

And

how

are, we

to

understand the schematic example, ’that this [person is] that one’?
The demonstrative pronouns (houtos ekeinos), in the received
text Just translated, are masculine. So it is-usually assumed that
Ar istot 1e is ta 1king a bout the pi easure of recogn iz ing a pi ctu.re
as a likeness of a particular human subject;

’that [portrait] is

[a likeness of] so-and-so’.27 But what do we ’understand’ or ’learn’
/
from this? As Lucas remarks (72, on 48b13), ’when we have 1earnt
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what already familiar thing a picture represents we have not learnt
much'. 28 Moreover, there need not be any conscious ’inference’ in
such

recognition.

When

we can

simply see straight

off

whom a

portrait depicts, there need be no particular feature from which
its subject

is consciously

inferred,

nothing

that it would be
natural to call an ’inference’ (sullogismos) at all. 29 Furthermore,
it is hard, on this interpretation, to see why Aristotle should
associate the

relevant

(48b13),

even

though

capacity

for

learning

philosophical

pleasure

he does
to

preeminently with

(somewhat

others.

He

grudgingly)
gives

a

philosophers
extend

prominence

the
to

pleasure in understanding which would seem out of

place, if he were thinking merely of the delight that anyone may
feel in recognizing the subject of a likeness. What he must have
in mind, surely, is a pleasure which, although universally shared,
is

taken

especially

in

the

sort

of

’viewing’ or

’observing*

(theorein, 48b11, b16) in which philosophers engage more than most
people. What can this pleasure be?
Fortunately,

two

other

passages

contain

related

lines

of

thought. The first occurs in the Rhetoric (1371b4~9):
Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows
that such things as acts of representation must be pleasant
- for instance painting, sculpture, poetic composition - and
every product of skilful representation ; this latter even if
the object represented is not pleasant: for it is not the
object itself which here gives delight; but there is an
inference that this is that (alia sullogismos esti hotl touto
ekeino), with the result that one learns something (Oxford
trans, rev. Barnes).
Here we find the same emphasis upon learning or understanding·;- the
same connection of learning with inference, and a similar schematic
example

to

illustrate

the

observation /that

even

where

the

21

represented object Is not pleasant, the representation will still
give.pleasure because It results In learning.

But there Is one

noteworthy difference between this text and the Poetics one. The
demonstrative pronouns here are neuter,* so that Aristotle need not
be thinking, at least primarily, and perhaps not at all, of human
examples. We shall return to this point shortly.
Our second passage comes from the Parts of Animals (645a7~17):
For even in animals that give no pleasure as regard's senseperception (pros aisthesin), nevertheless in terms of
scientific study (pros theorian) nature who fashioned them
provides unbounded pleasure for those who can recognize causes
(aitiai) and are by nature philosophers. Indeed, it would be
paradoxical and illogical, if when studying their likenesses
we enj'oy doing so because we are at the same time studying
the skill that fashioned those likenesses, such as painting
and sculpture, yet we do not love still more the study of the
oriainals constituted by nature, at least when we can discern
their causes' (trans. Balme).
Here we have a contrast between failure to please the senses and
boundless pleasure given to the intellect through scientific study.
And Aristotle argues that the intellectual
even

inherently

unpleasant

obj'ects

can

pleasure of studying
compensate

for

their

repugnance to the senses.
Wlnat n-s notable in this text

is the extent

to which the

pleasure afforded by nature's products comes from recognition of
cauSes, ’for those who can recognize causes and are by nature
philosophers' (645a10), and 'at least when we can discern causes'
(a15). Our marvel at nature's skill depends upon our understanding
the ends for which she makes her products, and the ingenuity with
which their parts are adapted to those ends. The pleasure comes
from grasping the ’final cause', i.e. understanding each part of
the creature in the light of its function, which is the study upon
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which Aristotle is just embarking in these lectures on animal parts
(639a14-16, cf. 646a8~646b27 ) .
If his analogical argument is to work here, the same must hold
for our admiration of the skill

with which a representation is

crafted. We admire each element in the likeness, when we understand
its final cause, its role in the larger whole to which it belongs.
This requires us to see what item in the original it was designed
to

capture,

and

thus

how

it

contributes

to

our

detailed

understanding of a real living thing. Hence we can learn from the
likeness ’what each thing is’. By noting, for example, that that
is the kidney or the bladder,
organs is.

we can learn what each of those

In this way we can learn about

inherently repulsive

objects from ’those likenesses of them that have been executed with
very great precision' 30, which are the ones that Aristotle says we
enjoy

viewing.

His

mention

of

'precision'

is

particularly

significant, for it is likenesses fashioned in precise detail that
can teach us, often better than any real thing, just how the parts
of

an

animal, or

of

each

of

its

organs,

are

structured

and

interrelated, and thus how they enable the organ or the animal as
a whole to function. That, indeed, is the purpose of á laboratory
model

or

diagram

contained.^

such

as

Aristotle's

lecture-room

must

have

And the pleasure taken in studying such likenesses

comes from what the Rhetoric calls 'learning and wondering’, i.e!
.¿from gratifying our curiosity and from admiring nature's cunning.
An excellent example occurs in the History of Anima 1s (510a3034), where Aristotle is describing the testicles of viviparous
footed animals, and expia ini ng the complex du ctwo rk that links them
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with the aorta, the kidneys, the bladder and the penis:
all this may be studied by the light of the accompanying
diagram (tes hupographês têsde) wherein the letter A marks the
starting point of the ducts that extend from the aorta: the
letters KK mark the heads of the testicles and the ducts
descending to them; the ducts extending from these along the
testicles are marked&A ; the ducts turning back, in which is
the white fluid, are marked&B ; the penisA ; the bladder E;
and the testicles
(Oxford trans. rev. Barnes).
Students at this lecture are indeed

’coming to understand,

and

inferring what each thing is', for they are learning, by studying
'this diagram here’, exactly how the genital apparatus of these
animals is structured.

To enjoy learning this from the diagram,

they must already be able to recognize the testicles as such (and
therefore must

have seen

such organs

before).

But the diagram

enables them also to figure out how they are connected with other
organs, how the seminal fluid is stored in them, and how the whole
reproductive system works. In this way a visual likeness can enable
the student to move beyond the mere ability to recognize certain
organs (’those are testicles'), to a detailed understanding of what
Job they do and how they do it ('so that

is what those things

arel'). This is notably the case when the diagram makes visible an
internal or 'deep' structure that escapes superficial observation,
and can be discovered only by dissection, which has been mentioned
Just above (509b23).
Ifthis is the class-room situation presupposed in our texts,
we may understand the neuter demonstratives' of the Rhetoric passage
as

identifying

items

in

a

diagram

or

replica

with

their

counterparts in a real animal, perhaps a cadaver on the dissecting
table. The words ’this is that' are accompanied by the lecturer's
/
gestures towards an element in the likeness and its counterpart in

the real thing. We understand and infer ’what each thing is V, when
we grasp-not only, what each item in the figure represents but also
what

the

real

thing

reptesented

is for.

The

understanding

and

inferring are not merely a matter of correctly deducing which real
item

is represented

something

about

by the

the

likeness,

real

item

but also of finding

itself.

’Learning*

out

from . a

représentâtion depends crucially upon coming to see what Job the
represented item does and how it does it.

Thus the ’understanding

and inferring’ that are made possible by the representation of even
inherently

disgusting

objects

are

connected

with

an

improved

understanding of the natural order. Which is precisely the claim
we have seen Aristotle making for epic and dramatic fiction with
respect to human life and action.
If çh-fg -¡s correct, it points to a suggestive and fruitful
analogy in Aristotle’s mind between learning from epic or tragedy
and learning from the detailed study of nature. In both there is
a tension between sensory or emotional revulsion and intellectual
fascination; and in both cases the latter compensates abundantly
for

the former. Especially

notable

in

this

connection

is

the

reference at Poetics 48b12 to corpses. 32 These, we remember, are
strewn all over the Homeric epics; and in tragedy, though deaths
do not usually occur on the stage, they are often reported in gross
physical detail. Pain and suffering, more broadly, are endemic in
both

genres;

suffering
woundings,

and

(pathos),
and

in

one

passage

exemplified

other

things

of

(52b1Q-13)

by
the

’visible
same

Aristotle
deaths,

kind',

as

treats

torments,
a

vital

ingredient in tragic plot, even though he does not regard all such

suffering as appropriately 'pitiful* for tragedy (53b15-18).
:

The visual horrors that he Is thinking of at Rhetoric 13?1b4-

9 and Poetics 48b10-12 do not seem specially likely to be the
corpses that were occasionally represented in ancient paintings or
sculptures.
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They are much more likely to be cadavers Introduced

in his own lecture-room,

and used for instruction or research.

These would very natural1y prompt references during a lecture to
'things which in themselves we see with pain', and would provide
handy analogues for the painful subject-matter of epic and drama.
In viewing both sets of objects,

we gain pleasure not from the

grisly

from

realities

themselves,

but

learning,

through

their

représentâtions, about the relevant living species.
Plato,

we may recall,

had viewed the

horrors of drama as

pandering to a morbid side of our nature. To illustrate one sort
of psychological

conflict,

he had mentioned

a certain

Leontius

(Republic 439e-440a) , who gratified a ghoulish urge to peek at the
corpses

of some

executed

criminals,

ashamed

though

he was

of

wanting to feast his eyes on the gruesome sight. The dramatist, in
Plato's view of him, caters for Just such a prurient impulse.·^
Aristotle's remarks about the représentât ion of inherently
painful things, such as base animals and cadavers, can be read as
a response to this. 35 What we enjoy in poetic fiction is not the
horrible

thing

itself,

but

coming

to

understand

that

horror,

learning about its genesis in human motivation and feeling, from
the way the author has depicted the doings and sufferings of his
characters. That is why Aristotle scornfully dismisses as 'quite
outside the sphere of tragedy'

(53b8-1Q)

those who strive for

26
sensational

effects

by,spectacul ar or lavish staging... The mere

relish of atrocity forms no part of the pleasure that is ’proper’
to tragedy.

If Aristotle lived in our time, he would pass similar

Judgment upon merchants of pain and cruelty in the film industry.
But he would also contend that the fictional exploration of human
suffering

in film or theatre need

no more

be morbid

than the

clinical study of animal pathology need be pathological.
We can now return to the text of Poetics 48b17. If it contains
the same thought as the parallel passages Just discussed, we shall
3g .
do wel1, with some critics,
to read the demonstratives at 48b17
as neuter, an easy emendation.

37

If we accept this change, what

Aristotle has in mind is not the identification of the subject of
a human likeness (’that is so-and-so’), but the recognition of each
element within

a complex diagram

or replica

as

representing a

corresponding part of a living thing (’that is the kidney’); and
the

learning

through

inference of general

truths

about

living

things of the relevant type (’what the kidney is', i.e. what it is
for and how it works). This reading makes the passage prefigure the
sort of dispassionate learning of universals from tragedy and. epic
that we have distilled from later texts.
It also frees Aristotle from a common suspicion of aesthetic
naivete. He says that a représentât ion will not produce pleasure
qua représentât ion, ’if one happens to have no previous familiarity
38
with the sight’ (48b17-18).
This has suggested to many readers
that the pleasure basic to aesthetic response lay, for him, merely
in seeing a picture's resemblance to a familiar original. To that
view it may, of course, be objected that one may derive greater

pleasure, and a more valuable aesthetic experience, from a,Ver Meer
portrait of some wholly unknown person, than from recognizing a
39
snapshot of one’s mother-in-law.
But on our account of the
passage, Aristotle does not mean that the pleasure’ produced by a'
likeness derives from seeing its resemblance to a familiar human'
individual; or that we can Judge a portrait aesthetically only in
terms of its likeness to someone we already know. For our interest
in

the

likeness

particular

item

is

not

limited

represented.

to

Rather,

mere
our

recognition
pleasure

of

comes

the
from

learning general truths about a certain sort of subject from parts
or aspects of that subject upon which the likeness has focused our
attention. We can gain pleasure from studying the likeness for what
40
it can teach us, in general, about its counterparts in real life.
It thus has the kind of instructive realism that is to be found in
epic or drama. For much in these, as in other modes of fiction,
strikes us as true to our own prior experience of human behaviour;
and we learn from them with enjoyment because they recover for us
what was implicit in that experience and enable us to view it with
a deepened understanding. If some such perspective upon fiction Is
implicit

in

Aristotle’s visual

insights

of

ch

9

regarding

example

its

at

48b15-19,

generalizing

aim

are

then

the

already

anticipated in ch 4.
*

Several important aspects of Aristotle’s literary theory have been
passed over in this paper. Almost nothing

has been said of the

emotional impact of fiction, or its contribution to the development
of moral

sensibility.

The whole problem of katharsis,

which no

28

overall

interpretation of the Poetics can ignore,

has been left

aside. There is no space even to raise the key questions here. But
perhaps we can 1ea rn somet hi ng from the texts discussed above,
without becoming entangled in more controversial issues. We have
found in those texts a significant analogy between learning from
tragedy or epic and the study of organic nature. In the light of
that analogy, 'poetry' should be seen not, with Plato, as the arch
enemy of philosophy but rather as its ally. Tragedy and epic can
illuminate human life and nature. The understanding to be gained
from fiction in general is a rich source of intellectual pleasure,
enough to give the Platonist a run for his money, even if it paid
no emotional or moral dividends at all.
Aristotle’s
considered,

approach

to

poetry,

may be broadly dubbed

in

the

aspect

we

have

’intellectual ist’. By way of

conclusion, and for the contrast it affords with that approach, it
may

be

worth

recalling

a

memorable

protest

once

voiced

by

Wordsworth against the intellectual study of nature:
Sweet is the lore that nature brings;
Our meddling intellect
Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things:We murder to dissect.
Aristotle did not, of course, share Wordsworth’s romantic vision
of 'nature’s lore'. To his eye, our admiration of the ’beauteous
forms' of things required the most intense scrutiny of their minute
structure. This applied no less to the artefacts called epic and
tragedy than to 1iving things. By taking them apart, our Intellects
- need

not

’mis-shape

their,, beauteous

forms'.

The

’anatomy’ of

criticism is not murder. On the contrary, works of fiction will
V
come fully to life, will do their Job for us, only if we will study
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them patiently,

analyze their detail,

element in the complex whole.

ponder

the role of each

It is in that way that a literary

work can achieve its full impact, produce its ’proper pleasure'.
In that direction we may still
literary criticism.

seek a sane rationale for

Along the Aristotelian trail we have followed,

the paths of the philosopher, the scientist, the fiction-writer,
and the critic will all ultimately converge in the human quest for
self-understanding. And it may well be in some such way that the
'old quarrel between philosophy and poet-craft’ of which Plato once
spoke should be finally laid to rest.
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NOTES
An early version of this paper, entitled

'Organic Models in the

Poetics 1, was presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
at Baltimore on January 7, 1989. I am grateful to the audience for
discussion of a pre~circulated draft, and also to participants in
philosophy

seminars

at

the

University

of

Western

Ontario

and

Carleton University, where subsequent versions were read.

All references to the Poet 1cs are to the Oxford Text of Kassel,
with

the

initial

'14'

omitted

from

Bekker

page

numbers.

The

translation used for quotations, unless otherwise noted, is from
the edition by S. Halliwell
paper

were

written

before

(1987).
I had

The early versions of this

an opportunity

to study that

edition or the same author’s masterly study of the Poetics (1986).
I hope that the present version, though differing from Halliwell
at certain points, may serve generally to reinforce his views on
the relation between fiction, piot-structure, and 'universels1 in
Aristotle, especially as expounded on pp 72-73, 98-101, and 10 5110 óf his 1987 commentary.

Besides Phaedrus 264c-d (to be noticed below), most notably in the
Timaeus, where the physical

world

is a cosmic animal , and the

Republic, where the polls is continually represented as if it were
the painting or statue of a living thing. See my 'Image and Reality
in Plato’s Republic ' passim.
/
The connection is especially well marked at Phaedrus 275d, where
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’the offspring of zographia' are said to ’stand like zonta’, but
to

remain

mute

If

asked

a question.

They

capture

the

static

appearance, but not the powers of speech and movement possessed by
live human subjects.

5.

Anatomy of Criticism, 14. Biological
distinctions among

literary genres

Influence upon Aristotle’s

will

not concern us further

here, but It Is evident In his sketch of their history. Tragedy,
he thinks,

evolved

from earlier

’full-grown’ state:

after

poetic

forms

Into Its

present

'many changes’, It stopped developing

’once It had attained Its own nature’ (49a15),

having acquired

’parts' not found In Its predecessors, even In epic (49b16-20).

6.

See, especially, the clinching point of Aristotle’s argument In ch
9 (51b27-29): 'It Is clear, then, from what has been said that the
poet should be a maker of plot-structures rather than of verses.
In so far as his status as a poet depends on mimesis,

and the

object of his mimesis Is actions'.

7.

Following

Halllwell,

I use

'lyric

poetry’ to

render

melopolia

(50a10, b16) This may remind us that the scope of Aristotle’s main
discussion

In the

Poet 1cs

’poetry’ In our sense.

Is

narrower

as

well

as

wider

than

Aristotle's almost total neglect of the

tragic chorus Is connected with his view of poiêsis as fiction.
There Is no general theory of poetry In the extant Poetics. As
Halllwell says (1987, 110), ’... It is the fictional framework of
a poem, not its verbal texture, which marks its poetic nature'. See

also his discussions of Aristotle’s neglect of the chorus (1986,
ch 8, esp 249-50; 1987, 152-154).

See Lucas’s notes on 51b2, 51b8, 59a25.

For a concise appraisal, see Hubbard, 102, n 1.

My Roman history tutor at Oxford, the incomparable C.E. Stevens,
used to say that if his own ingenious version of certain episodes
in Cicero’s political career were accepted, it ’made the history
much more piquant’. So indeed it did; but we should bear in mind
that

’history’ in English contains an ambiguity (not shared by

’poetry’) between historical facts and an historian’s account of
them. ’Piquancy', even when it is apt as a characterization of the
former, is a dubious virtue in the latter. Historical facts may be
piquant, or they may be dull as ditch-water,

but either way the

historian’s first duty is to ascertain and report them. Dullness
is obviously a defect in a play or novel, but in a history need not
be a fault of the. same magnitude. Good historical narrative, as we
tend to think of it, has to be selective,

and no less unified,

organized, and focused than good fiction. It is also, preferably,
no less readable; and the imaginative flair needed to 'make the
past live* may be as important as the sober virtues befitting a
Judicious

scholar.

But

when

Aristotle curiously nowhere

writers
mentions

such

as

by name)

Thucydides
impart

(whom

to their

narrative the character of an epic or a tragedy, one may argue that
their works embody literary values which are external

to their
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basic task, and which will even be inimical to that task, if they
should

lead the historian to project

a fanciful

pattern on to

events. Aristotle does not, however, defend his contrast between
poetry and

history

in any such way.

His

low view of

history,

particularly of the 'histories’ disparaged at 5Sa21-29, may perhaps
be conditioned by that usage of historia in which it meant mere!y
a collection of ’raw data' from which generalizations have not yet
been distilled.

'Histories’ on that level will be limited to the

recording of particular facts, since the general laws through which
the

facts

might

be

explained

or

interpreted

remain

as

yet

unformulated.

11.

Hubbard,

Halliwell

and

Janko

epitithemene

take

(51b10)

as

concessive. Lucas (121, on 51b10) plausibly argues for a temporal
interpretation,

on

the

basis

of

the

construction in ch 17. See, especially,

directions
55b12:

for

'after this

plot
[sc.

after mapping out the plot in broad outline], the poet should now
supply the names and introduce episodes'.

12.

Space limits

preclude

adequate discussion of the relationship

between the 'qualitative* (ch 6) and ’quantitative' (ch 12) parts
of tragedy. But the distinction is, I suspect, zoologically based,
the 'qualitative* parts being thought of., as corresponding to the
constituent materials of an animal, and the 'quantitative* to its
organs.

moría

is

used

at

47a11

for

both

quantitative

and

qualitative parts of poetry, and seems interchangeable with mere,
also used

of both types of

'part'

(50a8,

52b14,

b25).

In the
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zoological works, as Peck has noted (Loeb ed. Pa rts of An 1mals ,
28), morion (unlike the English ’parts') covers 'uniform' stuffs
(blood,

bone,

etc) as well as the

them. Aristotle could,

then,

'non-uniform'

organs made of

have thought of the 'quantitative'

parts of tragedy (prologos, epelsodlon, etc) as blended together
from the 'qualitative' ones In different proportions, just as an
animal's

organs

are

variously

composed

of

blood,

bone,

etc.

Strictly, this conception of 'qualitative parts' would not suit the
'part' called muthos, to be discussed below. For muthos, as 'the
soul'

of

tragedy.

Is

not

comparable

with

any

material

stuff

composing a living thing, but only with Its ’form’. But the analogy
between plot-structure and ’soul1 may not yet have suggested Itself
to Aristotle when he distinguished broadly between ’qualitative'
and ’quantitative’ parts.

13.

teleutê, though commonly meaning ’death’. Is used for the tail-end
of a creature at PA 685a1 (cf. GA, 720b18), and for the end of a
bone

at £A

654b24.

At

Metaphys. 1Q21b28

Aristotle

notes

that

teleute ('death’) Is called telos ('fulfilment') In a secondary
sense, because both are extremes (eschatra). Here, though teleute
means ’death', It shares with telos a connection with the Idea of
’extremity'.

14.

The text at 50b39 Is uncertain, and there Is reason to suspect tou
analsthêtou

chronou.

If this

Is

taken

to

mean

'time

that

Is

Imperceptible', or ’an Imperceptible Instant of time’ (Janko), or
even

'for

perception

of

it

is

practically

instantaneous’
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(Halliwell). Aristotle says elsewhere (De Sensu 448b18,

b24-25)

that there could be no Imperceptible period of time: and one may
doubt the explanation of Lucas

(113,

on 50b38),

that Aristotle

believed in a connection between the size of an object and the
length of time needed

to look at it.

Aristotelian terms,

’activity’ (energeia), the exercise of a

an

Seeing an object

is,

in

capacity that is as fully realized at any one moment of its use as
at any other.

In those terms it takes no time at all to see an

object, hence no more time to look at an elephant than at a flea.
There

is much to be said for deleting chronou with Bonitz,

or

perhaps for emending the text more radically, to read sugcheitai
gar hê theôria tou eggus anaisthêtou: ’for the observation of what
is nearly imperceptible is confused'. The difficulty with chronou
is somewhat lessened, however, if theôria is taken, as I suggest
below, to mean ’study’. And the textual uncertainty casts no doubt
upon the reason why the viewing of a minute creature is said to be
’confused'. As Lucas (1oc cit) says, 'once an object is too small
for its parts to be distinguishable, so that their relations cannot
be seen, it cannot be beautiful'.

15.

Halliwell’s version, quoted above, seems to me not to capture the
force of either theôria or sugcheitai at 50b38, or of theôrousi
and ek tes theories at 51a1-2. The sense required in b38 is that
what is barely perceptible is too confused to be studied ; and in
51a1-2 that unity and wholeness are lost on the observers as, a,
result of their studying, 1 .e . they can't see the wood for the
/
trees. My argument below turns partly upon understanding theôrein
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and theoria as 'studying', but I sometimes speak of 'viewing' or
'observing',

in

order

to

avoid

prejudging

interpretation

in

translation. See also n 16.

16.

Hal li well

('it is not possible to derive a sense of unity and

wholeness from our perception of it') misses the suggestion that
the viewing process itself actually destroys awareness of unity
and wholeness. Janko and others (’its unity and wholeness vanish
from the observer's view’) make ek tes theories redundant. Else
('so

its

unity

and

wholeness

are

lost')

omits

the

phrase

altogether, as does Bywater (’the unity and wholeness of it is lost
to the beholder'). Hubbard (101) comes closer to the sense needed:
'since our view of it is not simultaneous,

so that we lose the

sense of its unity and wholeness as we look it over'; but ek may,
I think, have 'causal' rather than (or alongside) 'temporal' force.

17.

At De Mem. 449b15~30 Aristotle argues that memory has the past for
its object: 'No one would say he was remembering what was present,
when it was present*, cf. 451a29-30:

'For a person remembers now

what he saw or experienced earlier. He does not now remember what
he experiences

now*.

It follows

that

we could not

be said

to

’remember* the plot as a whole while still watching or hearing the
play. Aristotle notes at De Mem. 452a2-4 that 'whatever has some
order,

as

things

(eumnemoneuta)*,

in

mathematics

because

of

the

do,
easy

is
mental

easily

remembered

passage

between

successive items. If the same point were applied to a well-ordered
/

dramatic plot, the causal links between its events would help us
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to remember the play as a whole. Thus, eumnêmoneuton at Poet 1cs
51s5-6 would refer to our retrospect upon an entire play, rather
than to our experience of it while it was still in progress.

18.

At 51bl9-26 Aristotle notes that a 1though most tragedies of his
time were based upon traditional legend, the few that were not so
based could please an audience Just as much;

and that even the

traditional stories were familiar only to few of the audience, yet
could still please everyone. Lucas (123, on 51b26) has questioned
whether the traditional stories were,
minority'.
direction

in fact,

’known only to a

But whether or not Aristotle’s premiss
of

his

argument

is

remarkable:

a

play

is true,
could

the
give

pleasure, he urges, not in spite of prior knowledge of the story,
but in spite of prior ignorance of it. He is not concerned, as a
modern critic might be, about prior knowledge 'spoiling it’ for the
audience or 'giving it away'. His appeal to invented plots (which
were

common

in

comedy,

51b12-15),

effectively

reinforces

his

contrast between poiesis and history, which stands out more clearly
in pure fiction than in plots based upon legend. For in the latter,
especially if legend is not differentiated from historical fact,
the fiction writer's aim becomes more readily confused with the
historian's.
fiction

in

This
our

confusion

own

time,

still
as

the

bedevils
current

historically
furore

over

based
Salman

Rushdie's novel well illustrates.
19.

Aristotle's prescriptions for plot-construction,

especially his

emphasis upon surprise (chs 9, 11) and denouement (ch 18), seem to
cater for an audience ignorant of the story;

although even

in

38
Oedi pus

Rex, which

arguably less

he so greatly

crucial

than

admired,

in a modern

these elements

whodunnit

are

(contra A.E.

Taylor 111). Agatha Christie's The Mouse-Trap is said to have been
ruined for the passenger of a London cab-driver who shouted, as his
client walked into the theatre, 'The detective did it I', in revenge
for an ungenerous tip. Was Oedi pus Rex ever ruined for an audience
by telling them that? If so, much irony in the play would have been
sadly lost upon them. But whether the story of a play is known in
advance or not, the unified structure upon which Aristotle insists
can be properly appreciated only in retrospect.

20.

Aristotle would

not,

indeed,

deny that a play can,

should, be enjoyed during performance.

and

indeed

Elsewhere (NE. 1175b12) he

notes that it is when we are not greatly enjoying something that
we are most readily diverted, remarking that people eat sweets in
the theatre when the performance is poor.

By implication,

enjoy the play most while thoroughly absorbed

they

in it. Since he

argues, in the context of that example, that the pleasure proper
to an activity is inseparable from, and enhances, our engagement
in it, there must,

presumably,

be pleasure concurrent with the

watching or hearing of a good tragedy well performed. But in chs
13-14·, when he discusses plot-structures that will elicit pity and
fear,

and thereby afford the

pleasure

'proper’ to tragedy

(as

distinct from other sorts of pleasure, which need not, or should
not, be aimed at, 53b10~11), his preferred structures include the
entire dramatic action from start to finish (esp. 52b34-53a2, cf.
51a9~15). And by way of charging certain dramatists with pandering
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to audience weakness (53a33~36),
giving

a pleasure

implies,

I think,

proper

he criticizes their endings for

to comedy

rather

that the pleasure

than

'proper'

tragedy.

This

to plays in both

genres depends crucially upon our response to their final outcome.
What happens to the central figure 'in the end' is vital for the
total impact of the play. Hence the pleasure taken in an overview
of the plot, through appreciating its unity and wholeness, must
await a retrospect upon the completed action.

21.

For a sequence of actions performed or represented over time, it
is arguable that no conspectus will be possible in a single moment.
Even a quick retrospect in memory will take some length of time,
unless a diachronic series can somehow be synchronical1y reviewed.
But

this

truism

does

not

invalidate

Aristotle's

demand

for

conspectus, or annul the distinction between a plot that can be
readily remembered and one that cannot.

22.

A speaker

at

Baltimore

helpfully

drew

attention

to

Rhetor ic

1409a24-b8, which has a similar analogy between visual conspectus
and retention in the memory.

Aristotle there contrasts two kinds

of prose style: 'strung together' (lexis eiromenl) and 'periodic'.
The

latter

is

easier

to

follow,

(1)

because

listeners

can

anticipate the end of each period while it is still being uttered
(like runners who can keep going as long as they see the goal ahead
of them); and (2) because each period, once its sense is complete,
'has' reached some definite conclusion', and is easily remembered.
A period

has

'a size

that

can

be seen

as

a whole’’ (megethos
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eusunopton, bl). It will stay In the memory (eumnêmoneutos,b5~6)
because it has a self-contained structure, with a beginning and an
end, and the listener thinks that 'something has been made definite
for him’. The same will apply mutât is mutandis to the comprehension
of a tragic plot. It requires anticipation of the ending while one
is following any given episode, but also a memory of each episode
after one has followed it, and thus a coherent memory of the entire
action after the play has been seen or heard. For retention in the
memory, see also n 17 above.

23.

This point is bound up with a reading of 53b12-13 which cannot be
fully elaborated here. I take it from the reference to 'shuddering
and

pitying’ at

53b5

that

Aristotle

does

indeed

require

the

tragedian to elicit fear and pity in the audience; but it seems to
me consistent with that to take ’the pleasure which derives from
pity

and

retrospect

fear
upon

by

means

the

of

mimesis’ (53b12)

whol e play.

See nn

to

20 and

attend
24.

their

A similar

retrospect upon epic will be suggested by the comparison of its
'proper pleasure' with that derived from the unity and wholeness
of an animal (59a20-2 1) .-.

24.

This is by no means to say that the pleasure is ’unfeeling’ or
’insensitive’, or to underrate (let alone to deny) the importance
of tragedy's affective impact. On the contrary, the more deeply we
have been moved by a play, the more we shall be disposed to reflect
upon and learn from it. Our cognitive faculties are engaged through
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our feelings ('through pity and fear'). That point, I suspect (but
cannot

here argue),

is the key to interpreting the text about

katharsis (49b27~28).

25.

In what

follows

Halliwell

(1986,

regarding
79),

ch 4,

I favour

it will

be seen

that,

with

’adjusting our interpretation of

it, and particularly of the status of its illustration from visual
mimesis, in the light of what is to be learnt about poetic mimesis
later in the treatise'. Although my way of doing this diverges from
his (see n 38 below), I share his concern to bridge the apparent
gap

between

impression

ch 4 and
that

later

pronouncements,

Aristotle’s thought

in

ch

and
4

to dispel

lacks

its

any

usual

subtlety.

26.

sumbainei theorountas manthanein kai sullogizesthai ti hekaston,
hoion

hoti

literally

houtos
as

ekeinos

possible,

(48b16~17).

manthanein,

I

given

have
here

translated
as

'coming

as
to

understand’, can also mean 'realize' or 'learn', cf. Hubbard, 86.

27.

This is the implication of Halliwell’s translation, as of eight out
of the ten other English versions or commentaries I have consulted.
The exceptions are Else and Nussbaum, both of whom emend the text
at 48b17 (see nn 28 and 36 below). For Halliwell’s view, see his
1986 book, 72 with n 36, 77 with n 42, 124, 129-130.

28.

On this point, cf. also Else (1957) 132, as well as (1967) 85, n
/

33. But his own interprétât ion, ’This individual is a So-and-so',
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is poorly served by emending houtos ekeinos, as he proposes, to
houtos ekeino: it would need toioutos ekeinos, as noted by Levens,
190. For further difficulties with houtos ekeinos see also nn 37
and 38 below.

Occasionally,

to

be sure,

inference

is needed

to

identify

a

portrait, though less often when the subject is already familiar
than when it is not. At Topics 140a21 Aristotle mentions the works
of early painters which could not be identified unless there was
an inscription on them. In such cases, presumably, a viewer might
try to infer the subject's identity from features in the picture
that the original was independently known to have possessed or from
other evidence not connected

with pictorial

content.

There may

indeed be great pleasure in solving such puzzles, and much to be
'learnt'

beyond

the subject's

bare

identity.

But

why should

Aristotle have chosen such relatively unusual cases to typify our
responses to likenesses (or to 'works of art') in general?

And why

should he suppose that such inferences will give pleasure only if
the subject has been previously seen? May we not enjoy figuring out
that

a

portrait

previously

seen

depicts
him?

Socrates

The

subjects

(say),

even

of

'early

without

having

painters'

had

presumably long been dead by Aristotle's time, so at least in their
case the contention of 48b17-19 would be implausible. See also n
39 below.

My translation
(Poet les

of toutôn tas

4 8b11 ) . The

phrase

eikonas

refers

tas malista

not

to

all

êkribômenas

likenesses

of
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repulsive objects, but to a subset of them, viz. those that have
been executed with very great precision.
missed in translation,

This nuance is easily

and some versions are badly misleading:

Janko, 'the most proficient images of things'; Bywater,
realistic représentâtions of them in art*.

'the most

It is important to ask

whether tas eikonas at b15 should be taken to mean 'likenesses' 1n
general, as by e.g. Halliwell, Janko, and Nussbaum (383), or to
mean 'these likenesses', i.e. the likenesses of repulsive objects
mentioned at b11 (as by Hubbard, Potts, and Else). With the latter
translation, the visual example at b17 should be an instance of
those horrors,

in which case it can hardly be an ordinary human

portrait, and the grounds for suspecting houtos ekeinos (as usually
interpreted)

will

be

strengthened.

Else

legitimately

renders

malista êkribômenas 'when executed in very great detail’, but he
prefaces this with a gratuitous 'even*. There is no basis for this
in the Greek; and the implication that we enjoy the likenesses of
horrible objects in_ spite of rather than because of their detail
is unwarranted.

Janko

(xv) most

curiously offers Aristotle a

defence against the objection that, on his theory, a sketch of a
cow (recognized from its four legs, horns etc) 'involves a loss of
detail', when detail is precisely what Aristotle himself stresses!
On the interpretation proposed here, the detail in the likenesses
is Just what makes them enjoyable objects of study.

31.

For

Aristotle's

lecture-room

entertaining article by Jackson.

and

its

equipment,

see

the

44
32.

The

implicit

relevance of this example

to tragedy

is rightly

observed by Halliwell (1986, 64, n 23).

33.

Thus

Lucas

somewhat

72,

on

48b12.

'The

oddly with such corpses

lowest

animals'

(as Lucas seems

would

consort

to realize),

whereas they could quite naturally be paired with cadavers.

34.

Leontius' voyeurism is not fully explained. As Annas notes (129),
it may

have

had a sexual

basis,

in view of

his

penchant

for

cadaverous youths, evidenced in a fragment from contemporary comedy
(cf. Adam, I 255, on 439e). But his story also reminds us of 'mixed
pleasures’ in
pleasure

felt

the Phi 1ebus
in suffering.

(47d-50e),
Although

for

it

this

exemplifies
particular

the

'mixed

pleasure' is explicitly discussed only in connection with comedy
(43a-50a), Plato mentions it as typical of a wider class of mixed
feelings aroused in drama as well as in real life (SOb-d).

The

indictments of mimetic poetry at Republic 603b-d and 6Q5d1-7 are,
I think,

broad enough to cover many such paradoxical

alloys of

pleasure with pain.

35.

These remarks once prompted Dorothy Sayers (222-223), tongue-incheek, to attribute to Aristotle 'a stout appetite for the gruesome
...The crawling horror of The Speckled Band would, we infer, have
pleased him no

less than The Corpse in the Car, The Corpse in Cold

Storage or The

Body in the Silo.' Of course we

need infer nothing

of the sort, any more than we need attribute macabre tastes to a
pathologist merely because he is keen on his Job.
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36.

Nussbaum (388) has recently adopted this emendation, also citing
Rhetoric 1371b5,ff. But she reminds us, lest the passsage should
sound

’too flat to support any sophisticated account of tragic

pleasure’, that ’Aristotle is here speaking very generally of human
delight, at all ages, in works of art of many types’. To my ear the
words

sound

extension

to

by

no

means

pleasure

in

'too

flat'

learning

to

support

from

poetic

the. required

representation.

Although their intended application is indeed general

(and they

lend themselves to further ’sophistication’)., they were prompted
not by 'works of art’, but by the specific sort of learning that
is achieved with visual aids in a classroom. This would explain the
prominence of ’philosophers’, downplayed by Lucas (73, on 48b17),
but properly stressed by Halliwell (1986, 78). The connection with
zoological

diagrams or replicas and cadavers

was seen

by Else

(1957, 128) and by Janko (74, on 48b10), but neither identifies the
specific learning about ’final causes' and organic functioning that
can be heard in the text, if touto ekeino is read at 48b17.

37.

8y

reading

touto

ekeino

we

avoid

the

switch

to

masculine

demonstratives, which is strange after ti hekaston (48b16-17), as
Lucas notes ad 1oc. For touto ekeino, cf. also Rhetoric 1410b18.
If we

retain

houtos ekeinos,

likeness as human,
diagram.

understanding

the pronouns cannot

the subject

of the

refer to an anatomical

If Aristotle (or his listener) wrote houtos ekeinos, he

may have had in mind the identification of each figure within a
composite picture containing several human subjects recognizable
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by members
pictures

of

his

audience.

In Aristotle's

(Jackson

suggested

that

two

such

lecture-room depicted well-known scenes

from Plato's Protagoras and Phaedo). Or the portrait might have
depicted

an

Individual

present

at

the

lecture,

who

could

be

Indicated as 'that person ' (ekeinos), such as Coriscus (Dje Mem.
450b31, cf. Des Insomn. 461b25). But whatever likenesses Aristotle
Is thinking

of,

'understanding'

and

'Inferring'

are

harder

to

Interpret If the demonstratives are masculine; and scarcely less
so (pace Else 1957, 132; 1967, 85, n 33) whether the likeness Is
recognized as being one of a familiar species ('that Is a squid,
an antelope or whatever') or of a familiar Individual
Coriscus’).

For

either

way

It

remains

obscure

just

('that Is
what

Is

'understood’ or 'Inferred', how the understanding or Inferring Is
supposed to take place,

and whs/ no pleasure Is produced for a

viewer who has not seen the Item before. If anatomical learning Is
not the key to the passage, Aristotle might be thinking of our
ability to ’understand and Infer’, from the representation of an
Individual, something about the type to which that subj'ect belongs,
through the highlighting of significant features of the type that
we

had not

plausible

noticed

beforé.

That

Interpretation

If we emended houtos ekeinos

fairly small

textual change.

would

be more

to tofoutos ekelnos,

In that way, as In mine,

a

the text

could be seen to prefigure the claim of ch 9, that poetry alms at
’universals’. But the link with Aristotle’s repeated emphasis In
Poetics upon causal nexus is far stronger If we read touto
ekeino, and take the demonstratives as advocated above.

47
8*

Hal 11 well (1886, 78, n 45) considers this assertion, together with

Rhet* 1371b4 f f , to refute Else's belief that Aristotle Is thinkina
of scientific models and diagrams: hence he thinks Else mistaken
1n see1ng any reference to un1versa 1s 1n t he v1sua 1 exam p1e . Bu t
t hie asse r11οn at 4 8b 17— 18 Is su re 1y puzz 11 ng on any v 1sw. It seerns
hardly more plausible to claim for a portrait that it will produce
no pleasure qua representation for one who has not previously seen
Its subject,

than to claim this for a replica or diagram..

And

Halliwell himself (1986, 77, n 42) finds difficulty In applying the
visual example to poetry if it contains no Implicit reference to
universale.

It is not,

Indeed,

clear exactly what Aristotle is

supposing at 48b17 not to have been 'previously seen', since no
grammatical object of 'seen' (proeorakos) is expressed. But could
he really have meant, or even believed, that a likeness can give
pleasure qua representation only if one has previously seen the
real pa r11eu 1a r subject represented? An enjoyable picture may have
no real subject: and even when it has one, why must one have seen
that very subject In order for the picture to produce pleasure qua
representation?

That

might

be so

If

the

pleasure

in

question

depended upon the viewer Ts ^abi 1ity to compare the likeness with the
original; but no such ability is here stressed (as it is at Phaedo
73c-~74e). It would be slightly more plausible to claim that one
must have previously seen an item of the relevant type: to enjoy
a picture of a horse qua representation,

one need not have seen

Dobbin, but must at least have seen a horse before, to be able to
recognize the likeness of one. But even that much might well be
disputed,

so It will

seem advisable to refine the claim still
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further,

by

saying,

e.g.,

that

the

picture

must

portray

'an

identifiable (though not necessari1v a real) figure’ (Halliwell,
1988 , 73, ital. added), or by speaking of 'the représentât ion of
a

p o s si ble

how

reality which it embodies’ (ibid 74, ital. added). Yet

exactly,

with

such

refinements,

are

we

to

understand

proeôrakos? In what sense must we have 'previously seen' a centaur
or a cyclops, in order to enjoy a picture of one? By connecting the
passage with scientific models and diagrams, and interpreting it
as I have proposed, we avoid such problems, but we can still relate
it to the doctrine about universels in ch 9.

39.

Lucas

(72,

on

48b13)

says

resemblance to the subject

that

the

mere

recognition

'has no relevance

of

a

to the aesthetic

enjoyment of a picture'. Compare Collingwood (44):

'The sitters

[for portraits by Raphael, Titian et al.] are dead and gone, and
we cannot check the likeness for ourselves. If, therefore, the only
kind of merit a portrait could

have were

its

likeness

to the

sitter, we could not possibly distinguish, except where the sitter
is still alive and unchanged, between a good portrait and a bad’.
Collingwood

goes

on

to ''recall

a

wealthy

art-collector,

who

refrained from buying portraits on the ground that there was no way
of telling a good portrait from a bad when once the sitter was
dead. 'He was', Collingwoood adds, 'a very good stockbroker'. See
also n 29 above.
40.

A parallel

point

about the

learning of

’universals’ could

be

derived from Aristotle's first explanation for poetry at the start
of ch 4 (48b5-8), i.e. the distinctive human tendency to represent.
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When he says that the earliest lessons are learnt through mimesis,
(4 8b7-8), he may be thinking (possibly inter alia, of. Halliwell
1986,

70 with n 34) of children learning to draw.

At

Politics

1338b1 he says that this should be taught, not for its commercial
utility,

’but perhaps rather because it makes them observers of

bodily beauty’. Similarly, at 1338a1-5, drawing is said to make
them better judges of the products of craftsmen.

We may remain

totally blind to certain visual properties of an object, despite
seeing countless instances of it, until we try to draw it. And by
drawing a particular, we may learn something about the class to
which it belongs.
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